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REsTITUTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRusT ON REscrssION FOR FRAUD Wn.L NoT
DISPLACE LlEN FOR REPAIRS ON VESSEL-The Maryland Dry Dock Company
sued to enforce its statutory maritime lien for converting a cargo vessel owned
by the Republic Steamship Corporation into a passenger ship, and the International Refugee Organization contested the action on the ground that the
money used to purchase the vessel was obtained by Republic from IRO by
fraud. IRO argued that Republic did not have authority to bind the vessel
because the vessel was impressed with a constructive trust in IRO's favor, and
that if Republic did have authority the trust took preference over the lien/
Held, a constructive trust on rescission for fraud is a remedy which does not

l The statute gives a lien for repairs to any vessel if the owner or a person authorized
by the owner orders the repairs. The following section declares that no person tortiously
or unlawfully in possession of a vessel shall have authority to bind the vessel. 41 STAT. L.
1005, §30 (1920), 46 u.s.c. (1946) §§971, 972, 973.
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affect the ownership of the wrongdoer, and any claim the defrauded person
has will not displace the. valid maritime lien. International Refugee Organization v. Maryland Dry Dock Co., (4th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 284.
Although the courts are in general agreement as to allowing a constructive
trust on rescission for fraud,2 there is a conffict as to the legal relationship created
between the defrauded party and the defrauder. There is some authority for
the proposition that the defrauded-person is still the legal owner. This may be
partly due to the fact that the courts are prone to talk of rescission as revesting
the legal title in the original owner.3 However, the majority of the cases hold
that the one acquiring the property is the legal owner.4 This would appear to
be the correct view, as the defrauded person intended to give up the legal title.
There is a greater conflict in the cases as to whether the wronged party has any
equitable title. Statements may be found to the effect that the wronged person
- has the equitable title and as equitable owner has the same rights that are
present in an express trust.5 The result of this in some cases is that the wronged
party takes priority over subsequent equitable interests.0 The report of the principal case does not give a clear view of IRO's contentions, but IRO seems to
have argued, first, that Republic was not the true owner and could not bind
the vessel under the statute, and second, that if Republic were the owner, IRO
had the equitable title which took free of the lien.7 The court denied all the
·contentions of IRO and agreed with the authorities which state that the constructive trust does not create "ownership" automatically but is merely a remedial
device which the court may impose in order to return the property to the defrauded party, giving him greater satisfaction of his claim than he would get
at law. The court accordingly held that the ownership of the wrongdoer was
2 CoRPUS JtJRis., Trusts §220 (1933); Rice v. Allen, 318 Mich. 245, 28 N.W. (2d)
91 (1947); Fresh v. Dunakin, 306 Ky. 87, 206 S.W. (2d) 203 (1947).
8 Missouri Brown Mfg. Co. v. Guymon, (C.C.A. 8th, 1902) 115 F. 112; Hall v.
Miller, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 147 S.W. (2d) 266; Williams v. Logue, 154 Miss. 74,
122 S. 490 (1929). 4 POMEROY, EQ. Jams. §1058: "Equity regards the cestui que trust
.••• as the real owner and entitled to all the rights and consequences of such ownership."
4 Meier v. Geldis, 148 Neb. 304, 27 N.W. (2d) 215 (1947); Binford v. Snyder,
144 Tex. 134, 189 S.W. (2d) 471 (1945); Frink v. Commercial Bank of Emmetsburg,
195 Iowa lOll, 191 N.W. 513 (1923).
Ii Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 136 N.W. 861 (1912), stating that the con•
.structive trust is an equitable estate arising immediately upon the act of the wrongdoer;
Raasch v. Lund Land Co., 103 Neb. 157, 170 N.W. 836 (1919); 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §472 (1946).
• O The wronged party took free of a mortgage placed on the land by the defrauder
in Cann v. Barry, 298 Mass. 186, 10 N.E. (2d) 88 (1937); Brennan v. Perselli, 353 Ill.
630, 187 N.E. 820 (1933).
7 mo may have also contended that even if Republic were the owner, Republic still
had possession wrongfully or tortiously and was unable to bind the vessel. mo could find
ample authority to the effect that the defrauder had wrongfully taken or was wrongfully
holding the property. Almost all of the cases speak of the defrauder in such words. The
court refused to so construe the statute and said that the decreeing of a constructive
trust did not mean the title of the owner was defective or his possession tortious. Principal
case at 827.
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not defective, and that he had power to bind the vessel.8 The court did use
language which could be construed to mean that IRO had an equitable interest which did not take preference because it was pitted against a superior lien,
but the more reasonable interpretation is that the court refused to enforce a
remedy which would defeat the statutory security interest deemed desirable to
commerce.9 In classifying and discussing constructive trusts with express trusts,
there is a tendency to mix the remedial aspects with substantive rules, and this
in tum may create a new substantive relationship between individuals. It is
submitted that the constructive trust should be considered solely as a remedy
for the wronged party against the wrongdoer which will not affect innocent
third parties' substantive rights in the property.10

. William H. Yager

s American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Fancher, 145 N.Y. 552, 40 N.E. 206 (1895); Falk v.
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922); Pound, ''The Progress of the Law," 33
HARv. L. REv. 420 (1920); 46 Mi:CH. L. REv. 116 (1947); Morehead, "Constructive
Trust as a Remedy For Fraud," 14 True. L. REv. 252 (1936). See also 31 Mi:CH. L. REv.
826 (1933).
9 "Origin of the Maritime lien is the need of the ship." Principal case at 288.
10The REsTITUTION RESTATEMENT §160 (1936) treats the constructive trust as setting up two property interests, making it more than a remedy. However in the same work
at § 172 it states that a bona fide purchaser takes free of the constructive trust and that the
same is true of transfers for security, of mortgages, pledges, and liens created by the fraudulent party. This theory would reach the same result as was reached in the principal case.

